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Abstract: Philosophers, psychologists, and economists have long argued that 
certain decision rights carry not only instrumental value but may also be 
valuable for their own sake. The ideas of autonomy, freedom, and liberty 
derive their intuitive appeal—at least partly—from an assumed positive 
intrinsic value of decision rights. Providing clean evidence for the existence of 
this intrinsic value and measuring its size, however, is intricate. Here, we 
develop a method capable of achieving these goals. The data reveal that the 
large majority of our subjects intrinsically value decision rights beyond their 
instrumental benefit. The intrinsic valuation of decision rights has potentially 
important consequences for corporate governance, human resource 
management, and optimal job design: it may explain why managers value 
power, why employees appreciate jobs with task discretion, why individuals 
sort into self-employment, and why the reallocation of decision rights is often 
very difficult and cumbersome. Our method and results may also prove useful 
in developing an empirical revealed preference foundation for concepts such as 
“freedom of choice” and “individual autonomy.”  
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11. Introduction 
The optimal allocation of decision rights is important for achieving efficient outcomes in 
organizations, markets, and society at large. In economics, the incomplete contracting literature 
led to an extensive analysis of institutions and organizations in terms of concepts like control 
rights, decision-making rules, or authority (e.g., Simon 1951, Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and 
Moore 1990, Aghion and Tirole 1997, Dessein 2002, Bartling, Fehr and Schmidt 2013). A 
common feature in these models is that decision rights are viewed as purely instrumental for 
achieving certain outcomes. In this paper, we examine whether decision rights are only a means 
to an end or whether they carry an intrinsic value beyond their instrumental value of providing 
the power to enforce preferred outcomes.1
Why would individuals value decision rights beyond their instrumental benefits? Social 
psychologists argue that human needs constitute a source of the intrinsic value of power and 
autonomy. Power is a dominant human need in McClelland’s (1975) motivation theory, and the 
self-determination theory by Deci and Ryan (1985) hypothesizes that autonomy is “essential for 
ongoing psychological growth, integrity, and well-being” (Deci and Ryan 2000, p. 229). 
Similarly, Frey et al. (2004) argue that independence and autonomy at the workplace are sources 
of procedural utility that raise happiness. In economic philosophy, the capabilities approach by 
Sen and Nussbaum (e.g., Sen 1985, Nussbaum 2000) advances a related argument. They 
emphasize that not only outcomes, but also the freedom of choice, are important for a person’s 
quality of life: “The central capabilities are not just instrumental for further pursuits: they are 
held to have value in themselves, in making the life that includes them fully human” (Nussbaum 
2000, p. 74). Finally, in moral and political philosophy, John Stuart Mill argues that liberty is 
“one of the elements of wellbeing” (1859, Chapter III), and individual autonomy is regarded as a 
basic moral and political value (see, e.g., Christman 2011).  
1 The idea that decision rights are intrinsically valued already found a particular manifestation in Adam Smith’s 
lectures on jurisprudence delivered at the University of Glasgow in 1762/63. He argued that slavery will never be 
abolished in a democracy of slave holders because “the love of domination and authority and the pleasure men take 
in having every[thing] done by their express orders, rather than to condescend to bargain and treat with those whom 
they look upon as their inferiors and are inclined to use in a haughty way; this love of domination and tyrannizing, I 
say, will make it impossible for slaves in a free country ever to recover their liberty" (Smith 1978, p. 186). We owe 
this reference to Jon Elster. 
2The difficulty in assessing whether individuals value decision rights intrinsically arises from the 
necessity to separate the intrinsic value from the instrumental value. We designed an experiment 
that achieves this separation on the basis of subjects’ revealed preferences. Our experiment 
consists of two parts. In Part 1, we implement a delegation game in which a principal (she) can 
keep her decision right or delegate it to an agent (him). If the principal keeps the decision right, 
she can unilaterally determine (i) which of two available project alternatives to implement and 
(ii) how much costly effort she wants to spend to implement the chosen project successfully. If 
the principal delegates the decision right, the agent can unilaterally determine the choices in (i) 
and (ii). The principal faces a trade-off when she decides whether to delegate the decision right. 
On the one hand, the party who holds the decision right has to bear the cost of implementation 
effort. On the other hand, the party can also choose the project alternative, and one project leads 
to a higher expected payoff for the principal, while the other project leads to a higher expected 
payoff for the agent. The effort determines the probability of success for the chosen project. The 
choices of the party holding the decision right therefore induce a lottery over monetary payments 
for both the principal and the agent.  
The key innovation in Part 1 of our experiment consists of implementing an incentive compatible 
method that elicits the principal’s point of indifference between keeping and delegating the 
decision right. To this end, the principal has to choose a minimum requirement for the agent’s 
implementation effort. Without knowing the principal’s minimum requirement, the agent 
privately chooses a binding effort level, which is implemented if delegation actually takes place. 
If the agent’s effort is above or equal to the minimum requirement, delegation takes place. If the 
agent’s effort is strictly below the minimum requirement, the decision right remains with the 
principal. Thus, the minimum requirement does not restrain the agent’s effort choice in any way. 
It only determines, jointly with the agent’s effort choice, whether delegation takes place. By 
determining a minimal effort requirement, the principal can keep the decision right whenever the 
agent’s actual effort choice would make her worse off and delegate the right otherwise. The 
mechanism ensures that it is optimal for the principal to set the minimum effort requirement in 
such a way that if the agent were to choose exactly the minimum requirement, the principal is 
just indifferent between keeping and delegating the decision right.  
3The principal’s own effort and project choices define a “control lottery,” and the minimum effort 
requirement together with the project alternative that gives the higher expected monetary payoff 
to the agent defines a “delegation lottery.” Note that the principal’s utility when keeping control 
consists of the monetary value of the control lottery plus a possible intrinsic utility component 
associated with being in control that reflects the intrinsic value of the decision right. If, instead, 
delegation takes place and the minimum effort requirement is chosen, the principal’s utility 
consists of the monetary value of the delegation lottery. Consequently, at the elicited point of 
indifference, the following equality holds: 
monetary value of the control lottery + intrinsic value of decision right = 
monetary value of the delegation lottery 
We measure the monetary values of the delegation and control lotteries in Part 2 of the 
experiment by eliciting the principal’s certainty equivalents of the delegation and control 
lotteries. Importantly, this value elicitation takes place outside the context of the delegation 
game. In Part 2, the principals are confronted with the lotteries their decisions in the delegation 
game generated, but these lotteries are now given exogenously, meaning that the intrinsic value 
component is absent. It follows that if the certainty equivalent of the control lottery is smaller 
than the certainty equivalent of the delegation lottery, then the principal must place a positive 
intrinsic value on the decision right. In other words, the principal is willing to pay a “control 
premium” if she intrinsically values the decision right, and this control premium can be 
measured by the difference between the certainty equivalent of the delegation lottery and the 
certainty equivalent of the control lottery.  
Our main finding is that principals indeed assign significantly larger certainty equivalents to the 
delegation lotteries than to the control lotteries in Part 2. Each principal played the delegation 
game 10 times, using 10 different parameterizations, and on average, the principals value the 
delegation lotteries 16.7 percent more than the control lotteries. At the individual level, the data 
show that the large majority of the principals assign a positive intrinsic value to decision rights. 
Moreover, our result is found consistently across the ten different parameterizations. We also 
find that the individual intrinsic valuations are correlated across the different parameterizations, 
suggesting that it is rooted in a relatively stable individual preference. 
4We do not want to argue in this paper that decision rights are always intrinsically valuable, and 
we expect situational determinants to affect this value crucially. For example, if decision rights 
involve the choice between fair and unfair outcomes, some people might prefer not making these 
decisions (Bartling and Fischbacher 2012). We address two potential situational determinants by 
systematically varying (i) the stake size of the decisions and (ii) the conflict of interest between 
the principal and the agent with regard to the project alternative in the ten rounds in Part 1. With 
regard to stake size, we find that the intrinsic value of decision rights is not just a fixed amount, 
but that it increases roughly in proportion to the payoffs under consideration. With regard to 
conflict of interest, we find that the intrinsic value of decision rights is lower if the principal’s 
conflict of interest with the agent is higher. This finding suggests that, while the instrumental 
value of decision rights is clearly higher if conflicts of interest are higher, having control in 
situations with a payoff conflict is less intrinsically valuable. 
Our experimental results contribute to the corporate finance and governance literatures, where 
non-contractible private benefits of control are at the center of the debate (e.g., Aghion and 
Bolton 1992). While private benefits are often interpreted as being material in nature, such as the 
tangible perquisites top executives enjoy (Jensen and Meckling 1976), the literature also refers to 
“private benefits of control as the ‘psychic’ value some shareholders attribute simply to being in 
control” (Dyck and Zingales 2004, p. 540). Similarly, to motivate private benefits of control, 
Hart and Moore (1995) claim that “among other things, managers have goals, such as the pursuit 
of power” (p. 568). However, the measurement of psychic benefits of control has escaped precise 
measurement until now. Our experimental study provides evidence for the relevance of private 
benefits of control and the theoretical literature that evolved around them.2 The relevance of this 
source of utility has also been discussed in the entrepreneurship literature. Hamilton (2000) 
shows that entrepreneurs effectively forego earnings for their self-employment; the same has also 
been suggested for scientists (see Stern 2004). Pugsley and Hurst (2011) document that non-
pecuniary motives are a major driver of the decision to enter self-employment, and Moskowitz 
2 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the intrinsic value of decision rights might even inhibit mergers due to disputes 
over the allocation of decision rights in the merged company. For example, the planned merger between Glaxo-
Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham in 1998, which would have been the largest merger ever at that time, failed 
because the top executives of the merging firms were unable to agree on the division of decision rights in the 
merged entity. This case of merger failure was also described as a “clash of egos” (Morrow 1998). The firms finally 
merged two years later, after the retirement of the SmithKline Beecham CEO. 
5and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) argue that the corresponding wage differentials may be as large as 
143% of total annual income. 
Our findings are also related to the literature on incomplete contracts and the delegation of 
authority (e.g., Aghion and Tirole 1997). Non-contractible intrinsic benefits of control are likely 
to bias principals towards keeping decision rights, possibly to the detriment of other parties 
within the organization and of organizational efficiency.3 For example, Fehr, Herz and 
Wilkening (2013) find significant underdelegation of decision rights from principals to agents in 
experimentally controlled situations in which delegation would clearly be preferable for both 
parties in terms of expected monetary payoffs. Similarly, Owens, Grossman and Fackler 
(forthcoming) find that individuals are willing to sacrifice expected earnings to retain control.4
Falk and Kosfeld (2006) provide a related experimental finding by showing that limiting agents’ 
choice sets can reduce positive reciprocity. However, none of these papers identifies the intrinsic 
value of decision rights. In Fehr, Herz and Wilkening (2013) as well as in Owens, Grossman and 
Fackler (forthcoming), the authors cannot rule out that the reluctance to delegate is driven by 
other factors such as regret or ambiguity aversion because of the uncertainty about the agents’ 
choices after delegation.5
Finally, our findings have a bearing on the implications of high-performance work systems 
(HPWS) (Ichniowsky, Shaw and Prennushi 1997, Ichniowsky and Shaw 2003, Bartling, Fehr and 
Schmidt 2012). The literature on HPWS argues that certain job characteristics such as workers’ 
decision rights and the payment of high wages emerge jointly because employees are required to 
contribute more ideas and effort under HPWS than under traditional systems; paying higher 
wages is a way to induce this contribution (Osterman 2006). The empirical results on the 
correlation between HPWS and higher wage levels are mixed, however, (e.g., Handel and Levine 
2004, Osterman 2006). This could be due to the fact that the provision of decision rights to 
3 Following this logic, models of empire-building (Niskanen 1971) may be partly founded on an intrinsic value of 
decision rights. 
4 Somewhat related, Dominguez-Martinez, Sloof, and von Siemens (2014) study the use of strategic ignorance in the 
delegation of real authority within a firm. They find that managers show a tendency towards control that seems to be 
driven by loss aversion. However, they do not provide a measurement of the intrinsic value of decision rights. 
5 These authors acknowledge this fact. Fehr, Herz and Wilkening attribute the reluctance to delegate explicitly to the 
principals’ regret aversion, while Owen, Grossmann and Fackler mention that ambiguity aversion may “contribute 
and partially explain the existence of a control premium” in their data.  
6workers raises their utility and thus reduces the necessity to compensate them with higher wages. 
The intrinsic value of decision rights might thus explain the missing link between HPWS and 
wage levels.  
Finally, we believe that our results may be of value for the debate on the intrinsic value of 
“liberty” or the “freedom to choose” (e.g., Mill 1859, Sen 1985, Puppe 1996, Nussbaum 2000). It 
is intuitively appealing to assume that “freedom of choice” is intrinsically valuable, but we are 
not aware of the existence of a preference based empirical foundation of the concept. There 
seems to be no precise empirical method that substantiates that individuals value the freedom to 
choose beyond the instrumental benefits that this freedom provides. Perhaps our method and 
findings may help develop such an empirical foundation.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the experimental design 
for measuring the intrinsic value of decision rights in detail. Section 3 presents the theoretical 
framework behind our experimental design. Section 4 reports the experimental results. Section 5 
discusses potential alternative explanations of our results. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Experimental Design
Our elicitation method is designed to measure a principal’s intrinsic value of decision rights, 
while controlling for her preferences over monetary outcomes as well as for her beliefs about the 
agent’s choices after delegation. We first collect the principals’ choices in a delegation game,
and later elicit their evaluations of the monetary consequences of these choices in a lottery task
with exogenously given lotteries.  
2.1 Part 1: The Delegation Game 
In Part 1 of the experiment we implement a one-shot delegation game, in which a principal is 
matched with an agent. Initially, the principal holds the decision right, which grants the right to 
implement a project, whose outcome determines the principal’s and the agent’s payoffs. The 
implementation of a project involves making two decisions: the choice between two possible 
project alternatives and the determination of the probability of success of the project. In total, the 
subjects participate in ten different delegation games (“rounds”) with perfect stranger matching. 
72.1.1 The Choice of the Project Alternative 
A project can be implemented in one of two alternatives: alternative ࣪ or alternative ࣛ. The 
successful implementation of the project generates a private monetary payoff that depends on the 
chosen alternative. The monetary payoffs for the principal and the agent are denoted by P and A,
respectively, and the specific monetary payoffs that result from alternatives ࣪ and ࣛ are given 
by ܲ࣪  or ࣛܲ for the principal and by ܣ࣪ or ܣࣛ for the agent. If the project implementation is not 
successful, the principal and the agent receive outside payoffs of ଴ܲ andܣ଴, respectively. The 
principal weakly prefers alternative࣪ over alternativeࣛ, and the agent weakly prefers 
alternativeࣛ over alternative࣪. Independent of the alternative, a successful implementation is 
always preferred to an unsuccessful implementation. We thus have ܲ࣪ ൒ ࣛܲ ൐ ଴ܲ andܣࣛ ൒
ܣ࣪ ൐ ܣ଴. The exact project payoffs differ across rounds of Part 1 of the experiment but they are 
always common knowledge. Before principal and agent know who will ultimately hold the 
decision right in a given round, both indicate privately their intended choice of the project 
alternative, and this choice is binding for the player who ultimately holds the decision right. The 
intended chosen alternative of the player without decision right will not be relevant, and is 
unobservable for the other player. 
2.1.2 The Determination of the Probability of Success of the Project 
The player with the decision right not only chooses the project alternative but also the probability 
of success of the project. The “effort” level—a chosen number—that the player with the decision 
right devotes to the project determines the probability of success. Effort can be chosen from the 
setሼͲǡͳǡ ǥ ǡͻͻǡͳͲͲሽ and corresponds to the percent probability that the project will be successful. 
The cost of effort is given by ܥሺܧሻ ൌ ݇ ή ܧଶ andܥሺ݁ሻ ൌ ݇ ή ݁ଶ, for the principal and the agent, 
respectively, where ܧ denotes the principal’s effort choice, ݁ the agent’s effort choice, and 
݇ א ሼͲǤͲͳǡͲǤͲʹሽ is a cost parameter. The cost parameter݇ varies across rounds but it is always 
common knowledge and identical for the principal and the agent.6 As with the choice of the 
alternative, before principals and agents know who will implement the project in a given round, 
both indicate their intended effort level. This choice is binding for the player who ultimately 
6 In the instructions to the participants, both cost functions are presented in a table that displays all possible effort 
levels and their associated costs. In addition, the instructions contained graphs illustrating the cost functions. 
8holds the decision right, and only this player will bear the corresponding cost of effort. The other 
player’s intended effort level will not be executed and no effort costs arise for this player. A 
player neither observes the intended nor the actual effort choices of the respective other player. 
2.1.3 The Delegation Decision 
In our game, initially the principal always has the right to choose the project alternative and to 
determine the probability of success. Instead of keeping the decision right, the principal can 
delegate it to the agent. The principal’s delegation decision is contingent on the agent’s intended 
effort choice and on the minimum effort requirement݁ א ሼͳǡǥ ǡͻͻǡͳͲͲሽ that is determined by the 
principal.7 Delegation takes place if and only if the agent’s intended effort level ݁ is at least as 
high as the principal’s minimum effort requirement݁. Importantly, the principal does not know 
the agent’s intended effort choice when she sets the minimum requirement. Likewise, the agent 
does not know the principal’s effort requirement when he chooses the intended effort level. 
2.1.4 The Order of Events in the Delegation Game 
The order of the events in the delegation game is shown in Figure 1. First, the agent chooses an 
intended project alternative and effort level in case he receives the decision right. Both decisions 
are binding should delegation take place. Second, the principal chooses the minimum effort 
requirement that—together with the agent’s intended effort—determines whether delegation 
occurs. The principal sets the minimum requirement without knowing the agent’s intended effort 
choice.8 Third, before the principal learns whether the agent’s intended effort choice matches the 
minimum requirement, the principal chooses an intended effort level and project alternative for 
the case in which she retains the decision right. Both decisions are binding should this case 
materialize.9
7 We did not allow for a minimum effort requirement of 0 to ensure a minimal probability of non-delegation. Recall 
that an agent can choose an effort level of 0, i.e. even if the principal chooses the lowest effort requirement, non-
delegation might occur. The principal’s own effort and project choice for the case of non-delegation is thus always 
incentive compatible. 
8 The principal is also not informed about the agent’s choice of the alternative, but subjects chose the alternative 
with the (weakly) higher monetary payoff for themselves in 97 percent of the cases. 
9 To control for potential order effects, we reversed the order of events in one session so that principals chose their 
intended effort level and project alternative before determining the minimum effort requirement. We do not find 
9Next, to ensure that the principals are fully aware of the consequences of all their choices, each 
principal is reminded of all her choices in the given round. Each principal is explicitly shown the 
monetary lottery that results for her and for the agent in case she retains the decision right. The 
principal’s effort choice, her corresponding effort cost, and the chosen project alternative fully 
determine this lottery. At this stage, each principal is also shown a lottery that results for her and 
for the agent if the agent’s effort choice matches exactly the minimum effort requirement and if 
the agent chooses project alternativeࣛ.10 The principals are then given the opportunity to either 
change some or all of their choices or to reconfirm them. 
Finally, the principal’s minimum requirement and the agent’s intended effort choice are 
compared to determine whether the decision right is delegated or not, and the decisions of the 
party who then holds the decision right are implemented. The participants receive no feedback 
about the outcomes in a given round until the end of the experiment.  
Figure 1: The Order of Events in the Delegation Game. 
significant differences in mean effort choices (p=0.61, two-sample t-test) and mean minimum effort requirements 
(p=0.70, two-sample t-test), and therefore pool the data from all sessions in the subsequent analysis. 
10 Note that this lottery reflects the situation in which the agent chooses the lowest possible effort that is compatible 
with delegation, i.e., among all the possible lotteries that can occur after delegation this is the one with the lowest 
expected value for the principal. In all other instances of delegation, the agent either chooses a higher effort, which 
results in a higher success probability, or the principal’s preferred project alternative࣪, or both. 
The agent chooses 
an effort level and a 
project alternative, 
which is binding in 
case he receives the 
decision right. 
t = 3 t = 1 t = 4 
Without knowing 
the agent’s effort 
choice, the principal 
sets the minimum 
effort requirement 
conditional on 
which she will 
delegate the 
decision right.  
The decision right 
is either delegated 
or not. The choices 
of the player who 
ultimately holds the 
decision right are 
implemented.  
t = 2 
Without knowing 
the delegation 
outcome, the 
principal chooses 
an effort level and a 
project alternative, 
which is binding in 
case she retains the 
decision right. 
The principal is 
reminded of all her 
choices and of the 
resulting monetary 
lotteries. She can 
change some or all 
of her decisions or 
reconfirm them. 
t = 5 
10 
2.1.5 The Parameters in the Different Rounds of the Delegation Game 
 Subjects remain in the role of the principal or the agent throughout the experiment. The ten 
rounds differ only with regard to the payoffs in alternative ࣪ and alternativeࣛ of the project and 
with regard to the cost of effort. The different parameterizations are implemented to test the 
robustness of an intrinsic value component of decision rights across different games as well as to 
test potential situational determinants of this value component. Table 1 gives an overview of the 
payoffs in each game. The order of the ten different games was randomized across sessions.  
Project successful  Project unsuccessful
࢑
Predicted
Values Alternative च Alternative ऋ
Principal 
(ࡼच)
Agent 
(࡭च)   
Principal
(ࡼऋ)   
Agent 
(࡭ऋ)
Principal
(ࡼ૙)   
Agent 
(࡭૙) ࡱ
࢕ ࢋ࢕
Game 1 220 190 190 220 100 100 ͲǤͲͳ 60 40
Game 2 280 235 235 280 100 100 ͲǤͲͳ 90 60
Game 3 180 140 140 180 100 100 ͲǤͲͳ 40 40
Game 4 220 160 160 220 100 100 ͲǤͲͳ 60 60
Game 5 260 260 260 260 100 100 ͲǤͲͳ 80 40
Game 6 440 380 380 440 200 200 ͲǤͲʹ 60 40
Game 7 560 470 470 560 200 200 ͲǤͲʹ 90 60
Game 8 360 280 280 360 200 200 ͲǤͲʹ 40 40
Game 9 440 320 320 440 200 200 ͲǤͲʹ 60 60
Game 10 520 520 520 520 200 200 ͲǤͲʹ 80 40
Table 1: The table shows the project payoffs in experimental points for principals and agents 
and the corresponding cost parameter݇. The table also shows the principals’ effort choices,ܧ௢
and the minimum effort requirements, ݁௢ that are optimal under the assumption of risk-neutral, 
selfish preferences and the absence of an intrinsic value component of decision rights. 
The parameters of the ten games differ systematically with respect to two dimensions. First, the 
payoffs in games 6 to 10 are exactly twice as high as those in games 1 to 5. We thus 
systematically vary the stake size; therefore, games 1-5 are labeled “low stakes” games whereas 
games 6-10 are labeled “high stakes” games. This is done to address the possibility that the 
intrinsic value of a decision right is not a fixed monetary amount but varies with the payoffs 
under consideration. 
11 
Second, the games vary the relative monetary difference for the principal and the agent between 
alternative࣪ and alternativeࣛ in case of success. We thus systematically vary the conflict of 
interest between the principal and the agent with respect to the project alternative. Conflict of 
interest is defined as the principal’s relative payoff difference between project alternatives ࣛ
and࣪, denoted asߙ ൌ ሺ ࣛܲ െ ଴ܲሻȀሺܲ࣪ െ ଴ܲሻ. Games 5 and 10 have “no conflict of interest” 
(ߙ ൌ ͳ), games 1, 2, 6, and 7 have a “low conflict of interest” (ߙ ൌ ͲǤ͹ͷ), and games 3, 4, 8, and 
9 have a “high conflict of interest” (ߙ ൌ ͲǤͷ). This is done to address the possibility that the 
intrinsic value of a decision right, just like its instrumental value, varies with the conflict of 
interest between the involved parties.  
At the end of the experiment, one of the ten rounds in Part 1 is randomly chosen to be relevant 
for payment. The player who holds the decision right in that round is given the opportunity to 
roll two ten-sided dice to determine whether the chosen project alternative is successful or not 
(unless the relevant effort level is either 0 or 100, in which case the project outcome is certain). 
The two ten-sided dice generate numbers between 1 and 100. If this number is below or equal to 
the chosen percent probability for the project success, then the project is successful. Otherwise, it 
is unsuccessful. Full feedback about the resulting payoffs is then given to both players.
2.1.6 Predicted Values for Selfish and Risk Neutral Principals 
To illustrate the behavioral consequences of the different games for an important benchmark 
case, we can analyze optimal behavior of the principal under the assumption of selfish and risk-
neutral preferences, and the assumption that decision rights carry no intrinsic value. A principal 
then maximizes her expected monetary payoff in case she keeps control: ா  ڄ ܲ࣪ ൅ ሺͳ െ
ܧሻ ڄ ଴ܲ െ ܥሺܧሻ. Let ܧ௢ denote the solution to this maximization problem. Given ܧ௢, the 
principal then chooses ݁ such that the expected monetary payoff in case that the agent chooses 
exactly ݁ǡ ݁ ڄ ࣛܲ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݁ሻ ڄ ଴ܲ, is equal to the maximized payoff in case she keeps control. This 
yields ݁௢ ൌ ൫ா೚ڄሺ௉࣪ି௉బሻି஼ುሺா೚ሻ൯ሺ௉ࣛି௉బሻ . The predicted values ܧ
௢ and ݁௢ for the different games are 
displayed in Table 1.   
12 
2.2 Part 2: The Lottery Task 
We implement an individual decision task in Part 2 of our experiment. Each principal states her 
certainty equivalents for 20 different lotteries. Each lottery determines probabilistically the 
principal’s own payoff and the payoff of another, randomly paired participant. These 20 lotteries 
are determined by a principal’s own choices in the ten rounds of the preceding delegation 
game.11 In each round of the delegation game, a principal’s choice of ܧ, ݁, and the project 
alternative defines a pair of lotteries: a control lottery and a delegation lottery.12 A principal’s 
intended effort choice, her corresponding effort costs, and the chosen project alternative fully 
determine a control lottery. The minimum effort requirement fully determines a delegation 
lottery. By definition, the latter occurs if an agent chooses exactly the principal’s minimum effort 
requirement, incurs the associated effort cost, and chooses project alternativeࣛ.
For example, assume that a principal chooses an intended effort level of ܧ ൌ ͷͲ (with an 
associated effort cost of 25), alternative࣪, and a minimum effort requirement of݁ ൌ ͶͲ (with an 
associated effort cost of 16 for the agent) in game 1 of Part 1 of the experiment (see Table 1). 
These choices imply the following two lotteries over the own and another participant’s payoff:  
x Control Lottery: The principal receivesʹʹͲ െ ʹͷ ൌ ͳͻͷ experimental points and the 
agent receivesͳͻͲ points with a probability ofͲǤͷ, and the principal receivesͳͲͲ െ
ʹͷ ൌ ͹ͷ points and the agent receivesͳͲͲ points with a probability ofͲǤͷ.
x Delegation Lottery: The principal receivesͳͻͲ points and the agent receivesʹʹͲ െ ͳ͸ ൌ
ʹͲͶ points with a probability ofͲǤͶ, and the principal receivesͳͲͲ points and the agent 
receivesͳͲͲ െ ͳ͸ ൌ ͺͶ points with a probability ofͲǤ͸.
Importantly, the control lottery and the delegation lottery are exogenously given in the lottery 
task. In particular, we do not inform the principals that the 20 lotteries that they face in Part 2 are 
11 Here we refer to participants who are in the role of a principal in Part 1 of the experiment as “principals” and to 
the other participants as “agents” for expositional reasons only. In the instructions to Part 2, participants are not 
called principals and agents; each participant is simply referred to as “you,” and a matched participant whose payoff 
might be affected by one’s own choice is referred to as a “random other participant.”  
12 In the participants’ instructions to Part 2, the 20 lotteries are not labeled in this way, nor are they distinguished in 
any other way. We introduce these terms here for expositional reasons only. 
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derived from their own choices in Part 1. The principals simply face each of the 20 exogenously 
given lotteries in an individually randomized order and specify their certainty equivalents. 
To elicit a principal’s certainty equivalents, we use an incentive compatible mechanism first 
introduced by Becker, DeGroot and Marschak (1964). For every lottery, a principal has to 
indicate the smallest certain payoff—the certainty equivalent—that she demands in order to be 
willing to accept the certain payoff instead of the lottery. A computerized random mechanism 
then determines the certain payoff actually offered to the principal. The offered certain payoff is 
drawn from a uniform distribution, where the bounds of the distribution are given by the two 
possible lottery payoffs for the principal. In the example of the control lottery above, the 
principal’s actual certain payoff is thus uniformly distributed between 75 and 195 points. If the 
actually offered certain payoff is at least as high as the stated certainty equivalent, the principal 
receives the actual certain payoff and the lottery is not played in this case. If the actual certain 
payoff is below the stated certainty equivalent, the lottery is played. Since principals face 
lotteries over their own as well as over a randomly matched other participant’s income, we also 
need to determine a payment to the respective other participant in case the certain payment is 
chosen.13 In the lotteries derived from the choices in games 1 to 5, this fixed payment is 100 
points, while it is 200 points in the lotteries that are derived from the choices in games 6 to 10. 
These payments match those of the projects in Part 1 in case of failure.  
At the end of the experiment, two of the 20 lotteries are randomly chosen to be relevant for 
payment.14 Each principal is given feedback about the size of the actually offered certain payoff 
for these lotteries. In case the actually offered certain payoff exceeds the principal’s demanded 
certainty equivalent, the principal receives the offered certain payoff and the other participant 
receives the associated fixed payment, i.e. the lottery is not played out. In case a principal’s 
demanded certainty equivalent exceeds the actually offered certain payoff, the lottery is played 
13 In this regard, our experiment is different from a typical experimental certainty equivalent elicitation task, in 
which lotteries and certainty equivalents involve only payments for the decision maker. Comparability with the 
lotteries in Part 1 makes it necessary to evaluate lotteries with payments to two parties. To avoid a stark discrepancy 
between the cases where the lottery is chosen and where the certain payment is chosen, the matched participant also 
receives a fixed payment in the latter case. Importantly, the fixed payment to the matched participant is constant 
within each pair of control lottery and delegation lottery. 
14 Since 1 out of 10 rounds was selected for payment in Part 1, we selected 2 out of 20 lotteries in Part 2, to keep the 
selection probability constant. 
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out. The principal is then given the opportunity to roll two ten-sided dice to determine the lottery 
outcome. Feedback is finally given to all participants.15
2.3 Further Experimental Measurements 
Subsequent to Part 1 and 2, further individual measures are taken. First, we elicit a participant’s 
loss aversion. Second, we measure a participant’s illusion of control. We collect these additional 
measures to analyze possible alternative explanations for a difference in certainty equivalents in 
Part 2. The additional measures are described in more detail in Section 5. 
2.4 Procedures 
We conducted three sessions with a total of 104 participants at the computer laboratory of the 
Department of Economics at the University of Zurich in October 2011 and two additional control 
sessions with a total of 68 subjects in November 2012. The subject pool consisted primarily of 
students at the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich. The 
experiments were computerized using the software Z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and the 
recruitment was done with the software ORSEE (Greiner 2004). An experimental session lasted 
2 to 3 hours. 
The participants were provided with written instructions and—in the first two parts of the 
experiment—had to answer control questions to guarantee their understanding of the 
instructions. Instructions for the lottery task in Part 2 of the experiment were handed out only 
after the delegation game in Part 1 was finished. Participants knew that the experimental session 
would consist of several parts, but they did not know the content of the future parts before the 
respective instructions were provided. The instructions for the loss aversion task were presented 
on a computer screen; the instructions for the illusion of control task were paper based. An 
English translation of all instructions can be found in the online Appendix. 
15 In Part 2, also the agents played the lottery task. This was done to entertain them during Part 2. Each principal 
thus also assumed the role of the “random other participant” in two randomly chosen lotteries and was paid 
according to the respectively matched agent’s choices. The participants were only informed about the additional 
earnings in the role of the “random other participant” at the end of the experiment. Our matching algorithm ensured 
that no participant was matched with another participant more than once in Part 2.  
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Payments were made for one randomly drawn round of the delegation game and for four 
randomly drawn lotteries in Part 2 (two of them in the role of the “random other participant;” see 
footnote 15). Subjects received additional payments in the loss aversion and illusion of control 
tasks. 100 experimental points were converted into 6 CHF, which resulted in an average payment 
of 75 CHF ($80.00 at the time of the experiment), including a 10 CHF show-up fee. 
3. Theoretical Framework 
We begin with analyzing the principal’s decision problem assuming no intrinsic value of 
decision rights, and then extend the analysis to show how our mechanism allows measuring the 
intrinsic value. 
3.1 The Principal’s Optimal Decision 
Let the principal’s utility function over lotteries be given by ܷሺܮሻ. In our context, a lottery ܮ is 
defined byܮ ൌ ሺݔ௦ఠǡ ݔ௙ఠǡ ݌ሻ where ݔ௦ఠ  and ݔ௙ఠ denote the outcome vectors in case the chosen 
project is successful (ݏ) or a failure (݂), respectively, ݌ denotes the probability of success, and 
߱ א ሼܿǡ ݀ሽ denotes whether the principal holds control (ܿ) or whether control was delegated (݀).
Each outcome vector specifies monetary payoffs, ݔ௝ఠ ൌ ቆ
ݔ௝ǡ௉ఠ
ݔ௝ǡ஺ఠ ቇ, ݆ ൌ ሼݏǡ ݂ሽ, where ݔ௝ǡ௉
ఠ  denotes the 
monetary payoff to the principal and ݔ௝ǡ஺ఠ  denotes the monetary payoff to the agent. The 
principal’s utility over certain monetary outcomes is further given by ݑሺݔ௝ǡ௉ఠ ǡ ݔ௝ǡ஺ఠ ሻ.
In Part 1 of the experiment, the principal chooses an effort level ܧ as well as a project alternative 
ߠ௉ א ሼࣛǡ࣪ሽ for the case that she keeps control. These choices determine the probability of 
success, ݌ሺܧሻ ൌ ܧȀͳͲͲ, as well as the payoff vectors in case of success and failure, 
ݔ௦௖ሺܧǡ ߠ௉ሻ ൌ ቆ ఏܲು
െ ܥሺܧሻ
ܣఏು ቇ and ݔ௙
௖ሺܧሻ ൌ ൬ ଴ܲ െ ܥሺܧሻܣ଴ ൰. Thus, the principal solves the following 
maximization problem:  
ாǡఏು ൫ܮሺݔ௦
௖ǡ ݔ௙௖ǡ ݌ሻ൯ ൌ ܧ ڄ ݑ൫ ఏܲು െ ܥሺܧሻǡ ܣఏು൯ ൅ ሺͳ െ ܧሻ ڄ ݑሺ ଴ܲ െ ܥሺܧሻǡ ܣ଴ሻ
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Denote the solution to this maximization problem by ܧכ and ߠ௉כ . These choices define the 
control lottery, which we denote by 
ܮ௖ ൌ ܮ൫ݔ௦௖ሺܧכǡ ߠ௉כሻǡ ݔ௙௖ሺܧכሻǡ ݌ሺܧכሻ൯ (1)
Second, in case of delegation, the agent’s effort choice ݁ and his project choice ߠ஺ א ሼࣛǡ࣪ሽ
determine the probability of success, ݌ሺ݁ሻ ൌ ݁ȀͳͲͲ, as well as the payoff vectors in case of 
success and failure, ݔ௦ௗሺ݁ǡ ߠ஺ሻ ൌ ቆ ఏܲಲܣఏಲ െ ܥሺ݁ሻቇ and ݔ௙
ௗሺ݁ሻ ൌ ൬ ଴ܲܣ଴ െ ܥሺ݁ሻ൰. Since ݔ௦
ௗǡ ݔ௙ௗ and ݌
are determined by ݁andߠ஺, we denote the lotteries in case of delegation by 
ܮௗሺ݁ǡ ߠ஺ሻ ൌ ቀݔ௦ௗሺ݁ǡ ߠ஺ሻǡ ݔ௙ௗሺ݁ሻǡ ݌ሺ݁ሻቁ, (2)
We can now determine the principal’s optimal choice of the minimum effort requirement after 
imposing some additional structure on the principal’s utility function over delegation lotteries. 
First, we assume that the principal’s utility from a delegation lottery is increasing in the 
probability of success and, second, that the principal weakly prefers if the agent chooses project 
alternative࣪:
Assumption 1: ߲ܷሺܮ
ௗሺ݁ǡ ߠ஺ሻሻ
߲݁ ൐ Ͳ
Assumption 2: ܷሺܮௗሺ݁ǡ ࣪ሻሻ ൒ ܷሺܮௗሺ݁ǡࣛሻሻ
Both assumptions are reasonable: A higher agent effort increases ݌ሺ݁ሻ without affecting ݔ௝ǡ௉ௗ ǡ and 
hence increases her expected monetary payoff. The same holds if the agent chooses project 
alternative ࣪ rather thanࣛ. Both assumptions are thus trivially satisfied for a purely self-
interested principal. We discuss potential implications of social preferences below.16
16 In principle, Assumptions 1 and 2 are empirically testable but we refrained from doing this because we considered 
it highly unlikely that they will be violated.   
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The delegation mechanism in our experimental delegation game allows the principal to set a 
minimum effort requirement ݁ such that decision rights are only delegated in case ݁ ൒ ݁. Under 
Assumptions 1 and 2, it therefore follows that the worst lottery that the principal may face after 
delegation is realized if the agent chooses ݁ ൌ ݁ and project alternative ࣛ.17 We call this worst 
lottery the delegation lottery, defined as 
ܮௗ ൌ ܮௗ൫݁ǡࣛ൯ (3)
Assumption 1 implies that the principal’s utility is weakly increasing in the agent’s effort choice. 
Consequently, the principal should optimally choose her minimum effort requirement ݁כ such 
that she delegates whenever delegation makes her better off compared to keeping the decision 
right, and she keeps the decision right whenever delegation would make her worse off compared 
to keeping the decision right. Figure 2 illustrates this decision.  
Figure 2: The principal’s utility in case of keeping control and delegation as a function of the 
agent’s actual effort. 
17 For the remainder of this section, we assume that the principal believes that the agent chooses project alternative 
ࣛ. Indeed, 97 percent of subjects chose the alternative that gave them the higher expected payoff. Nonetheless, it 
may be the case that the principal believes that the agent chooses project ࣪ in case of delegation. Later in this 
section, we discuss that such beliefs can only bias our measurement of the intrinsic value of decision rights 
downwards, and we would hence underestimate the intrinsic value. Constructing the delegation lotteries using 
project alternative ࣛ is thus conservative.  
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Suppose the principal sets the minimum effort requirement below ݁כ, say at ǁ݁ ൏ ݁כ, such that 
ܷሺܮ௖ሻ ൐ ܷ൫ܮௗሺ ǁ݁ ǡࣛሻ൯. It can then happen that the agent chooses an effort level that is strictly in 
the interval > ǁ݁ ǡ ݁כ@, so that delegation occurs but yields a strictly lower utility to the principal 
than ܷሺܮ௖ሻ. A similar argument applies if the minimum effort requirement is set above ݁כ.
Consequently, it is optimal for the principal to set the minimum effort requirement such that the 
utility of the control lottery is just equal to the utility of the delegation lottery. 
ܷሺܮ௖ሻ ൌ ܷሺܮௗሻ (4)
Given Assumption 1, equation (4) has a unique solution if the following assumption holds. 
Assumption 3: ܷቀܮௗሺ݁ ൌ ͳͲͲǡࣛሻቁ ൒ ܷሺܮ௖ሻ ൒ ܷቀܮௗሺ݁ ൌ ͳǡࣛሻቁ
If the principal prefers to keep the decision right in case the agent provides the lowest possible 
effort ሺ݁ ൌ ͳሻ, and if she prefers delegating the decision right in case the agent chooses the 
maximum possible effort ሺ݁ ൌ ͳͲͲሻ, then it follows from Assumption 1 that there exists some ݁
such that equation (4) is satisfied.18
3.2 Measuring the Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights 
Equation (4) provides the basis for measuring the intrinsic value of decision rights. The equation 
determines a control lottery and a delegation lottery that yield the same utility for the principal in 
the delegation game. Let the certainty equivalent ܥܧሺܮሻ denote the certain payment to the 
principal that makes the principal just indifferent between the exogenously given lottery ܮ and 
certain payments of ܥܧሺܮሻ to the principal and ܣ଴ to the agent (remember that this is the 
payment to the agent in case the certain payment is chosen in Part 2 of the experiment). If the 
18 Note first that Assumption 3 is clearly met for all parameters in our experiment, assuming pure self-interest and 
risk neutrality. But if ܷሺܮ௖ሻ ൏ ܷሺܮௗሺ݁ ൌ ͳǡ ߠ஺ሻሻ, the principal may always want to delegate and thus choose the 
lowest possible ݁, and if ܷሺܮ௖ሻ ൐ ܷሺܮௗሺ݁ ൌ ͳͲͲǡ ߠ஺ሻሻ, the principal may never want to delegate and thus choose the 
highest possible ݁. Consequently, chosen values of ݁ ൌ ͳ or ݁ ൌ ͳͲͲ may not reflect the principal’s point of 
indifference between keeping control and delegation. If we observe choices of the lowest (highest) possible ݁, we 
may therefore overestimate (underestimate) the intrinsic value of decision rights. In Section 5.5, we present evidence 
from a control treatment showing that we are not overestimating the intrinsic value of decision rights for principals 
who choose the lowest possible ݁.
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principal does not assign any utility to the decision right per se, equation (4) can only be satisfied 
if the certainty equivalent of the control lottery, ܥܧሺܮ௖ሻ, is equal to the certainty equivalent of 
the delegation lottery, ܥܧሺܮௗሻ.
uሺܥܧሺܮ௖ሻǡ ܣ଴ሻ ൌ ሺܥܧሺܮௗሻǡ ܣ଴ሻ (5)
ܥܧሺܮ௖ሻ ൌ ܥܧሺܮௗሻ (6)
Therefore, in Part 2, where we confront the principals with the exogenously given control and 
delegation lotteries that they determined in the delegation game by their choices of ܧכ, ߠ௉, and 
݁כ, the certainty equivalents of the respective pairs of lotteries should be identical.  
However, if decision rights carry value per se, utility needs to be defined not only over lotteries, 
but also over the allocation of decision rights: ܷሺܮǡ ߱ሻ, where ɘ א ሼǡ ሽ denotes the allocation 
of decision rights.19 If decision rights are per se valuable, indifference in the delegation game 
implies  
ܷሺܮ௖ǡ ܿሻ ൌ ܷሺܮௗǡ ݀ሻ (7)
The certainty equivalents of the exogenously given lotteries, ܥܧሺܮ௖ሻ and ܥܧሺܮௗሻ, do not contain 
the potential intrinsic value of decision rights. To account for the potential intrinsic value, we 
define ఠܸ, as the (possibly negative) monetary measure of the principal’s intrinsic value 
associated with either having the decision right (߱ ൌ ܿ) or not having the decision right (߱ ൌ ݀). 
Therefore, ௖ܸ captures potential intrinsic utility components of being in control, whereas ௗܸ
captures (potentially negative) intrinsic utility components of being in a subordinate position. We 
can then define the following identity:   
ܷሺܮఠǡ߱ሻ ൌ ݑሺܥܧሺܮఠሻ ൅ ఠܸǡ ܣ଴ሻ, (8)
19 Note that Assumptions 1 – 3 must be satisfied for a principal’s utility function defined over lotteries and decision 
rights, ܷሺܮǡ߱ሻ, while—for expositional reasons—we stated it above for ܷሺܮሻ only.   
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Equations (7) and (8) therefore imply that ݑሺܥܧሺܮ௖ሻ ൅ ௖ܸǡ ܣ଴ሻ ൌ ݑሺܥܧሺܮௗሻ ൅ ܸୢ ǡ ܣ଴ሻ. If keeping 
the decision right is preferred over transferring the decision right ሺ ௖ܸ ൐ ௗܸሻ equation (7) can only 
be hold if ܥܧሺܮ௖ሻ, i.e., the instrumental value of the decision right, is lower than ܥܧሺܮௗሻ. In 
other words, the principal is only willing to transfer the decision right if she is compensated 
monetarily. 
We can thus quantify the potential intrinsic value of decision rights as the certain amount of 
money that a principal demands as a compensation for the transfer of the decision right:20
Intrinsic Value of Decision Right ൌ ௖ܸ െ ௗܸ ൌ ܥܧሺܮௗሻ െ ܥܧሺܮ௖ሻ (9)
3.3 Discussion  
It is important to note that, given Assumptions 1 and 2, our measure of the intrinsic value 
accounts for the principals’ unobserved risk and social preferences. First, the indifference point 
between the control and the delegation lottery is endogenously chosen based on the principal’s 
unobserved risk and social preferences. Since the monetary payoff consequences of the control 
and delegation lottery are unchanged when they are presented as exogenously given lotteries in 
Part 2, these preferences similarly enter the determination of the certainty equivalents in Part 2. 
However, extreme forms of inequity aversion may violate Assumption 1 or 2, in which case 
there may not be a unique indifference point which implicitly determines the principal’s 
compensation request for giving up her decision right. For example, although an increasing ݁
always increases the principal’s expected payoff, it may also increase advantageous inequality, 
and if the principal strongly dislikes this inequality her expected utility may not increase. 
However, such extreme forms of inequality aversion are implausible.21
20 Equation (9) shows that our design does not allow disentangling whether a possible positive intrinsic value of 
decision rights stems from the desire to be able to affect someone else’s payoffs (as is the case if the principal keeps 
control) or from the aversion to be affected by some else’s decision (as in case of delegation to the agent), or both. 
Addressing this question is an interesting topic for future research.  
21 There are several reasons for this. First, the structure of the delegation game often involves the choice between 
advantageous and disadvantageous inequality rather than the removal of any form of inequality. In such situations 
individuals typically prefer advantageous over disadvantageous inequality. Second, if delegation occurs, the agent 
chooses his utility maximizing effort level (and project variant). Thus, if the agent chooses a very high effort level 
21 
Moreover, our measure of the intrinsic value is independent of beliefs about the agent’s effort. It 
depends only on the minimum effort requirement ݁, which does not depend on the agent’s 
actually chosen effort. This implies that ambiguity about the agent’s effort choice cannot affect 
the measurement. Moreover, the intrinsic value is calculated based on the conservative 
assumption that the agent chooses project alternative ࣛ in case of delegation. In principle, it may 
be the case that the principal believes that the agent chooses project ࣪ with positive probability 
in case of delegation. This would imply that the principal chooses ݁ such that 
ܧఏಲ ቂܷ ቀܮௗ൫݁ǡ ߠ஺൯ቁቃ ൌ ܷሺܮ௖ሻ ൒ ܷሺܮௗሻ, i.e., the control lottery is weakly preferred to the 
delegation lottery as defined in (3). Note that this inequality even holds if the principal is 
ambiguity averse, because ܮௗ denotes the worst possible lottery in the support of the principal’s 
beliefs. This biases our measurement of the intrinsic value of decision rights, as defined in (9), 
downwards, sinceܥܧሺܮௗሺ݁ǡ ߠ஺ሻሻ is smallest if ߠ஺ ൌ ࣛ. Consequently, if principals indeed 
believed that project alternative ࣪ is chosen with positive probability, we would underestimate 
the intrinsic value of decision rights. 
4. Results 
4.1 The Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights
Our first result concerns the question whether principals assign intrinsic value to their decision 
rights:  
Result 1 (Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights): The large majority of the principals 
value the delegation lotteries significantly more than the corresponding control 
lotteries. Thus, on average, principals value decision rights intrinsically. 
Figure 3 shows each principal’s average certainty equivalent of the control lotteries on the 
horizontal axis and each principal’s average certainty equivalent of the delegation lotteries on the 
vertical axis. Each of the 69 dots in Figure 3 thus represents one principal.
(or project variant ࣪) that causes advantageous inequality for the principal, the agent is himself responsible for this 
inequality, which is likely to mitigate the principal’s inequality concerns. 
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If principals derive no intrinsic utility from decision rights, the average individual certainty 
equivalents of these lotteries should be equal and thus lie on the Ͷͷל line. It is evident from 
Figure 3, however, that the majority of observations lie above the Ͷͷל line. On average, the 
certainty equivalents of the delegation lotteries are 16.7 percent larger than those of the control 
lotteries. A one-sample t-test22 shows that this percentage difference is significantly larger than 
zero (p<0.001). This indicates that, on average, the principals assign a positive intrinsic value to 
decision rights.  
Figure 3 also reveals considerable individual heterogeneity in the intrinsic value of decision 
rights. The standard deviation in the average percentage difference between the certainty 
equivalents of the delegation and control lotteries is 15.6 percent. The large majority of 
principals assign positive intrinsic value to decision rights, while only a minority assigns a 
negative value. 83 percent of the principals assign on average higher certainty equivalents to the 
delegation lotteries, whereas 17 percent of the principals do the opposite. A non-parametric 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test rejects the hypothesis that principals value the delegation lotteries and 
the control lotteries equally (p<0.001). 
22 We use the average percentage difference in certainty equivalents of each principal as one observation to perform 
the t-test. All reported p-values refer to two-sided tests. 
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Figure 3: Individual principals’ average certainty equivalents of the control lotteries and the 
delegation lotteries in experimental points. Each of the 69 dots represents one principal. The 
figure shows that most principals value the delegation lotteries on average higher than the 
control lotteries. 
To test the robustness of our main result, we analyze whether we consistently measure a positive 
intrinsic value of decision rights in all ten delegation games. Figure 4 shows the average 
percentage difference between principals’ certainty equivalents of the delegation lotteries and 
control lotteries for all ten delegation games. The figure shows that the principals assign higher 
certainty equivalents to the delegation lotteries in each of the ten delegation games, and the 
difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level in nine out of ten games in both a one-
sample t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Game 9 is significant at the 5 and 10 percent 
level only (݌ ൌ ͲǤͲʹ, t-test and݌ ൌ ͲǤͲ͸, Wilcoxon signed-rank test).23
23 We perform these tests using each principal’s percentage difference between the certainty equivalents of the 
delegation and control lotteries as an observation. 
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Figure 4: Average percentage difference between the certainty equivalents of the 
delegation lotteries and control lotteries, sorted by delegation game. Error bars represent 
one standard deviation of the percentage difference in the certainty equivalents. 
This finding is summarized in the following result: 
Result 2 (Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights in the Separate Games): The intrinsic 
value of decision rights is significantly positive in all ten delegation games. 
The observation that a positive intrinsic value of decision rights is not only found in most 
principals, but also across the different delegation games, lends support to the robustness of our 
finding.24
The elicitation of the certainty equivalents in Part 2 is time consuming and researchers interested 
in measuring the intrinsic value of a decision right may, therefore, want to rely on a simpler 
proxy measure in some environments. The expected values of the delegation and control lotteries 
24 Further support for the robustness of our results can be found in one of the author’s Ph.D. thesis. In Herz (2011), 
12 delegation games (all with payoffs different from those in this paper) were used to elicit the intrinsic value of 
decision rights. The findings confirm the results presented here. The average percentage difference in certainty 
equivalents between the delegation and control lotteries is highly significant and amounts to 14.2 percent, a large 
and highly significant majority of 92 percent of principals (33 out of 36) positively values decision rights, and the 
finding is robust across all games (significantly so at the 1 or 5 percent level in 10 out of 12 games). The 
experimental design here amends the design reported in Herz (2011), especially with regard to their sequential 
structure, it varies the payoffs more systematically, e.g. with respect to the conflict of interest and the stake size of 
the decision, and it adds additional measures. 
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generated in Part 1 may provide the basis for such a proxy measure. For this proxy to be useful, 
the expected monetary payoffs of the delegation and control lotteries should be highly correlated 
with the certainty equivalents. We find that this is indeed the case. The pair-wise correlation 
between a principal’s expected payoff and the elicited certainty equivalent of a lottery is 
ߩ ൌ ͲǤͺͻ, which is highly significant (p<0.001). Moreover, our measure of the intrinsic value of 
decision rights (the difference in the certainty equivalents of the corresponding control and 
delegation lotteries) is positively correlated with the respective difference in the principal’s 
expected payoffs between these two lotteries (ߩ ൌ ͲǤͷͺ, p<0.001).  
Equivalent to Result 1, we find that the expected payoffs of the delegation lotteries are on 
average larger than the expected values of the control lotteries; the difference amounts to 7.1 
percent. A one-sample t-test shows that this percentage difference is highly significant 
(p<0.001).25 Moreover, the average difference in expected payoffs is positive for 82.6 percent of 
the principals, which is almost identical to the percentage of principals (83 percent) who value 
decision rights positively when this value is measured on the basis of certainty equivalents 
(p<0.001, Wilcoxon signed-rank test).  
Analogous to Result 2, we find that the principals’ average expected payoffs in the delegation 
lotteries are larger than those in the control lotteries in all delegation games. These differences 
are significant at least at the 5 percent level for eight of the ten delegation games using one 
sample t-tests or Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.26
Finally, we analyze whether the intrinsic value of decision rights is measured consistently across 
principals in the ten delegation games. Consistency would require that if principal ݅ assigns a 
higher intrinsic value to decision rights than principal ݆ in one game, then principal ݅ also assigns 
a higher value in the other games, i.e., that individual intrinsic values are correlated across 
games. One way to assess this consistency is to compute Cronbach’s alpha, a concept frequently 
used in psychology and other social sciences as a measure of the internal validity of a 
psychometric test score (Cronbach, 1951). Cronbach’s alpha measures the extent to which 
25 To perform the t-test, we averaged the percentage differences in expected values for each principal. 
26 In games 5 and 9, the p-values are p=0.31 and p=0.09 for the t-tests; for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, the p-
values are p= 0.50 and p=0.06, respectively. 
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different items in questionnaires or—for our purposes—economic games measure the same 
latent variable. To measure this correlation, one could compute the correlation of the average 
intrinsic value of decision rights between the first five games and the last five games. Since this 
split is arbitrary, Cronbach’s alpha is the mean of all possible split-half correlations of the games: 
Formally, Ԣ ൌ ேேିଵ ൬ͳ െ
σ ௩ೕಿసభ ௔௥ሺ௫ೕሻ
௩௔௥ σ ௫ೕೕಿసభ
൰ǡ whereܰ is the number of games (ten in 
our case), ݒܽݎሺݔ௝ሻ is the variance of the measured values in the j-th game, and ݒܽݎσ ݔ௝ே௝ୀଵ  is the 
variance of the sum of the measured values in the ܰ games. Cronbach’s alpha thus measures the 
correlation between the games and it varies between zero and unity. Cronbach’s alpha is equal to 
0.62 when we consider the percentage difference in certainty equivalents and equal to 0.77 when 
we consider the percentage difference in expected values. This suggests a relatively strong 
positive correlation of our intrinsic value measures across principals in the ten games. 
4.2 Situational Determinants of the Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights 
In this subsection, we identify two situational determinants of the intrinsic value of decision 
rights. Figure 4 reveals that the intrinsic value varies across the ten different delegation games. 
This raises the question how situational characteristics, i.e., game specific factors, affect the 
intrinsic value of decision rights. As we described in Section 2.1.6, our experimental design 
enables us to consider two potential drivers: (i) the stake size and (ii) the conflict of interest.  
The stake size is systematically varied between the “low stakes” games (1-5) and “high stakes” 
games (6-10). We are interested in whether the intrinsic value of a decision right is simply a 
fixed amount, or whether it systematically varies with the monetary amounts under 
consideration. The left panel of Figure 5 shows the average intrinsic values of decision rights for 
the two stake size levels. It can be seen that decision rights are valued about twice as high in the 
high stakes games. The difference amounts to 18.6 experimental points and is statistically highly 
significant (p<0.001, t-test; p<0.001, Wilcoxon signed-rank test).27 This suggests that the 
intrinsic value of decision rights is not simply a small, fixed value but that it indeed scales with 
the stakes involved in the decision. This finding is summarized in: 
27 The intrinsic value is again first averaged for each principal before a one-sample t-test is performed. 
27 
Result 3 (Stake Size): The intrinsic value of decision rights increases with the 
monetary amounts at stake.
Figure 5: The left panel shows the average intrinsic value of decision rights by stake 
size. The right panel shows the average intrinsic value of decision rights by conflict 
of interest. The bars display one standard deviation of the mean. 
The conflict of interest between the principal and the agent is systematically varied across games 
by varying the principal’s relative payoff difference between project alternatives ࣛ and ࣪. We 
hypothesize that the conflict of interest between the involved parties is a driving factor not only 
of the instrumental value but also of the intrinsic value of decision rights. This hypothesis is 
motivated by debates about the definition of power in the political science literature. While some 
scholars define power simply as being “able to make, or able to receive, any change” (Locke 
1975[1690], p. 111), others postulate that these choices must affect another party with conflicting 
interests to constitute power (Dahl 1957, Polsby 1963, Lukes 2005). The systematic variation of 
the payoffs across the different games allows us to analyze how the intrinsic value of decision 
rights changes when the conflict of interest changes, or when there is no conflict of interest in the 
choice of the alternative at all. 
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The right panel of Figure 5 shows the average intrinsic values of decision rights for the different 
levels of conflict of interest. If individuals are motivated by a desire for control over another 
individual, and if the degree of power is increasing in the conflict of interest, we should observe 
that the intrinsic value of decision rights (granting power over another individual) should 
increase if the conflict of interest between parties increases. 
Our data do not support this view, and in fact point in the opposite direction. Figure 5 shows that 
the intrinsic value of decision rights is higher when there is no conflict of interest. While the 
difference between the intrinsic values of decision rights is not statistically significantly different 
between low conflict and no conflict of interest, the intrinsic value is significantly smaller under 
high conflict of interest compared to both low and no conflict of interest (p<0.01, respectively, 
using paired t-tests or Wilcoxon signed-rank tests). This is summarized in the following result: 
Result 4 (Conflict of Interest): The intrinsic value of decision rights is higher, the 
lower the conflict of interest between the principal and the agent.
One should remember that the instrumental value of decision rights increases as the conflict of 
interest increases, since enforcing the own preferred choice becomes more important. The widely 
held intuition that individuals’ value power, control, or decision rights particularly in situations 
in which there is “conflict” is therefore not necessarily wrong, but it is likely to be driven by its 
instrumental value. A possible explanation for Result 4 is that making decisions that are also in 
the best interest of another person are “comfortable” decisions to make. Subjects may derive 
more self-esteem from successful implementation if their actions also profited another person. If, 
however, own actions impinge upon the interests of another person, these psychic benefits might 
be reduced. Our data do not allow us to pin down all the relevant and potentially contrarious 
situational determinants of the intrinsic value of decision rights. In future research, it would thus 
be interesting to disentangle the driving forces behind Result 4, and to learn more about the 
situational determinants of the intrinsic value of decision rights in general. 
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5. Alternative Explanations  
We attribute the differences in certainty equivalents to an intrinsic preference for decision rights, 
but are there alternative explanations? We already showed in Section 3 that risk and social 
preferences as well as ambiguity aversion cannot explain our results, because we controlled for 
these preference dimensions with the experimental design. In this section, we explore and 
discuss further potential alternative explanations. 
5.1 Loss Aversion
Loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) might be a partial explanation for the observed 
size of the difference in certainty equivalents. A principal initially holds the decision right, and 
parting with this right might be perceived as a loss. It is important to remember, however, that 
some value has to be present for a loss to be perceived. Hence, loss aversion cannot fully explain 
the difference in the certainty equivalents, but it might contribute to its size.  
In the final part of the experiment, we elicited an individual’s degree of loss aversion using 
lottery tasks, where subjects had to accept or reject a series of lotteries involving possible losses 
of different sizes ܺ.28 The participants’ decisions allow us to measure their loss aversion. The 
amountܺ at which a participant starts rejecting the lotteries is an indicator of his or her loss 
aversion. For example, a participant who rejects all lotteries with a potential loss ofܺ ൐ ͵ is 
classified as more loss averse than a participant who only rejects all lotteries with a potential loss 
ofܺ ൐ ͷ.29
Our data do not show a correlation between a subject’s average intrinsic value of decision rights 
and his or her loss aversion measure (pair-wise correlation coefficient: ߩ ൌ ͲǤͲ͵Ǣ ݌ ൌ ͲǤͺͳሻ.
28 Each participant faces six lotteries that only affect his or her own payoff. After being presented with each lottery, 
the participant decides whether to accept it or not. Accepting involves a 50 percent chance of winning CHF 6 but a 
50 percent chance of losing CHF X, where X takes on the six different values Xא{2,3,4,5,6,7} in the six different 
lotteries. If a participant rejects a given lottery, he receives a payoff of CHF 0. Once all lottery decisions are taken, 
one of the six lotteries is randomly selected for actual payment and—in case of acceptance —a computerized 
random move determines the outcome. This design is adopted from Fehr and Götte (2007). 
29 In our data, all principals had a unique switching point. However, one principal rejected lotteries with low losses 
and accepted lotteries with high losses. Exclusion of this subject does not change the result. 
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Our data therefore do not lend support to the possibility that the measured difference in the 
certainty equivalents is mainly a manifestation of the subjects’ loss aversion. 
5.2 Illusion of Control
Illusion of control is a concept from psychology that goes back to Langer (1975). Charness and 
Gneezy (2010) define illusion of control as being “concerned with greater confidence […] in a 
favorable outcome when one has a higher degree of personal involvement, even when one’s 
involvement is not actually relevant” (p. 134). To assess the behavioral relevance of the illusion 
of control, Charness and Gneezy (2010) elicited individuals’ willingness to pay for personally 
rolling (instead of the experimenter rolling) a die that determined an individuals’ actual payment. 
They find that only a small minority of individuals (less than 10 percent) have a willingness to 
pay for rolling the die themselves in their task. 
The findings of Charness and Gneezy (2010) cast doubt on the behavioral relevance of illusion 
of control. We nevertheless measured our subjects’ illusion of control. The reason is that an 
illusion of control—if it existed—could have contributed to our main result because it could have 
increased the subjectively perceived instrumental value of the decision right.  
We adopted a modified version of the incentive compatible elicitation method used by Charness 
and Gneezy (2010), and elicited each principal’s willingness to pay for the right to personally 
roll the two ten-sided dice that determine the random outcomes in Part 1 and 2 of the 
experiment.30 If principals are subject to an illusion of control, they should value rolling the dice 
positively because this increases their personal involvement in determining the final outcomes: If 
a participant opts not to roll, the experimenter casts the dice in front of the participant. If the 
30 Recall that there are up to three random outcomes per participant, i.e., the two ten-sided dice might have to be 
rolled up to three times. In Part 1, the participant who ultimately holds the decision right can determine the success 
of the project by rolling the dice. In Part 2, two decisions are paid, i.e., there are up to two lotteries with uncertain 
outcomes. The elicitation uses a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism where subjects could receive 30 points in 
return for giving up the right to roll the dice themselves (in the three cases mentioned above). Subjects stated how 
many of the 30 points they are willing to pay as a price for keeping the right to roll the dice themselves. They stated 
their willingness to pay before they knew whether they kept or received the decision right, and which lotteries were 
payoff relevant. The computer then drew the actual price from a uniform distribution over all integers from 1 to 30 
including the bounds. If the actual price did not exceed the stated willingness to pay, a participant kept the right to 
roll the dice and received 30 points minus the actual price. If the actual price was higher, the subject received all 30 
points and the experimenter rolled the dice.  
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participant rolls the dice, the experimenter watches him or her do so. In both cases, the 
experimenter enters the result on the participant’s computer screen.  
In accordance with Charness and Gneezy (2010), we find that 91 percent of principals have no 
willingness to pay any amount for rolling the dice themselves. Hence, the correlation between 
the average individual intrinsic value of decision rights and the individual measure of control 
illusion is very low and even slightly negative (pair-wise correlation coefficient:ߩ ൌ െͲǤͲͷǢ ݌ ൌ
ͲǤ͹ͳ).
5.3 Preference Reversals
It is a well-established result in experimental economics that preference reversals can occur 
when different procedures are used to elicit preferences over lotteries. Slovic and Lichtenstein 
(1968) first demonstrated this phenomenon; it received increased attention after a study by 
Grether and Plott (1979). They demonstrated that subjects valued some lottery A higher than a 
lottery B in a pricing task, but preferred lottery B over lottery A when faced with a binary choice 
between the two lotteries. These experiments usually involve a pair of lotteries with comparable 
expected value, but one lottery offers a high probability of winning a modest amount of money 
(“high-probability lottery”), whereas the other lottery offers a low probability of winning a large 
amount (“high-amount lottery”). Subjects tend to prefer the high-probability lottery when faced 
with a binary choice, but assign a higher value to the high-amount lottery in a pricing task. This 
phenomenon is shown to be due to overpricing of high-amount lotteries in the pricing task 
(Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman, 1990). 
Is it possible that the observed difference in certainty equivalents in Part 2 of our experiment 
stems from the phenomenon of overpricing high-amount lotteries (relative to high-probability 
lotteries)? More specifically, is it possible that subjects characterize the delegation lotteries they 
face in Part 2 as high-amount lotteries and that they therefore place a higher certainty equivalent 
on these lotteries compared to the control lotteries?  
The principals earn a higher amount in the delegation lottery in case of success than in the 
corresponding control lottery if ܲ࣪ െ ܥሺܧሻ is smaller than ࣛܲ. It turns out, however, that there is 
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no systematic relationship between the success payoff in the control lottery (ܲ࣪ െ ܥሺܧሻ) and the 
success payoff in the delegation lottery ( ࣛܲ). In 49.5 percent of the cases, the control lottery’s 
success payoff is larger, it is smaller in 49.5 of the cases, and the success payoffs are equal in 1 
percent of the cases. There is thus no basis for characterizing the delegation lotteries as “high-
amount lotteries.” Moreover, our pairs of control and delegation lotteries also do not follow the 
high-probability vs. high-amount lottery pattern with respect to the probabilities of success. The 
average probabilities of success in the control and delegation lotteries are comparable; they 
amount to 60 percent in the control lotteries and to 51 percent in the delegation lotteries. In 49 
percent of the lottery pairs, a higher probability of success is observed in the control lottery, 
while the probability of success is higher in the delegation lottery in 39.5 percent of the pairs. 
11.5 percent of the pairs have the same probability of success.  
Finally, as shown in Section 4.1, we not only find consistent and significant differences in the 
certainty equivalents, but also in the expected values between the control and delegation 
lotteries. The principal’s actions in Part 1 of the experiment determine these expected values, i.e. 
the elicitation procedure in the lottery task of Part 2 cannot affect them. The overpricing of high-
amount lotteries therefore cannot explain the differences in the expected values. It is exactly this 
overpricing, however, that underlies the preference reversal phenomenon. 
5.4 Reciprocity
Intention based reciprocity (e.g. Rabin 1993) could, in principle, explain the measured difference 
in certainty equivalents in Part 2 of our experiment. To see this, consider the following 
argument: A negatively reciprocal principal chooses a low effort level ܧ that becomes relevant if 
she remains in control because she only keeps, by design, the decision right if the agent does not 
fulfill her minimum effort requirement. If the principal perceives the agent’s effort choice as an 
“unkind act”—after all, it falls short of the minimum effort requirement—she may act in kind 
and choose a low effort level in order to lower the agent’s expected payoff. The important 
consequence of this reciprocal reaction is that it reduces the principal’s expected payoff in the 
control lottery relative to the delegation lottery. This in turn lowers the respective certainty 
equivalent, which could explain our main finding. 
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However, for the reciprocity argument to be valid, when the principal retains the decision right, 
her perception of the agent’s unfriendliness should be higher, the lower the minimum effort 
requirement: If the agent does not even meet a very low requirement, the agent’s effort level 
must be very “unkind.” Hence, the differences in the certainty equivalents between the 
delegation and control lotteries in Part 2 should—according to the reciprocity argument—be the 
higher, the lower the minimum effort requirement. It turns out that the opposite is true in our 
data. In a regression of the percentage difference in certainty equivalents on the minimum agent 
requirement, controlling for subject and game fixed effects, the percentage difference in the 
certainty equivalents increases by 4.5 percentage points per 10 point increase in the minimum 
agent requirement (p<0.01, standard errors clustered at the subject level). Thus, the data do not 
appear to be consistent with an explanation based on reciprocity. 
5.5 Failure to Elicit the Principal’s Indifference Point
The validity of our results depends on the correct elicitation of the indifference point in the 
delegation game. Hence, a potential concern is whether subjects understood the trade-off they 
faced in the delegation game, and whether we successfully elicited the indifference point. In 
particular, it could be that (i) violations of Assumption 3 (boundary condition) bias our main 
result or that (ii) subjects are boundedly rational and did not fully understand the elicitation 
mechanism. 
5.5.1 Corner Solutions 
We may fail to elicit a principal’s point of indifference if she chooses a corner solution for  (see 
Assumption 3 and footnote 18). While principals rarely select  ൌ ͳͲͲ (1.9 percent) in our 
experiment, we observe a non-negligible share of  ൌ ͳ choices (15.8 percent). If a principal 
chooses  ൌ ͳ, Assumption 3 may be violated, i.e., the utility derived from the control lottery 
ܷሺܮ௖ǡ ߱ ൌ ܿሻ may be strictly smaller than the utility derived from the delegation lottery
ܷሺܮௗሺ݁ ൌ ͳǡࣛሻǡ ߱ ൌ ݀ሻ. That is, a principal might even be willing to pay in order to delegate—
on top of accepting a lottery in which an agent chooses ݁ ൌ ͳ. In our experiment, however, we 
did not elicit such an additional willingness to pay for delegation. Our elicitation mechanism in 
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Part 2 may thus fail to elicit the principal’s point of indifference in these cases and, consequently, 
we may overestimate the average intrinsic value of decision rights. 
We address this concern in several ways. First, most of our subjects never or rarely chose  ൌ ͳ.
51% of the subjects never chose  ൌ ͳ in our experiment, and 77% chose ൌ ͳ twice at most. 
Therefore, for the majority of our subjects, violations of Assumption 3 only pose a minor 
problem that is unlikely to bias our results systematically. Second, we conducted a rather 
conservative version of the sign test for the null hypothesis that the median intrinsic value of 
decision rights is zero. The sign test is only based on data that indicate the sign but not the size of 
the intrinsic value measure. For our version of the sign test, we make the conservative 
assumption that principals who chose  ൌ ͳ value the decision right negatively (irrespective of 
the elicited certainty equivalents). We assign a positive intrinsic value to the decision right 
whenever the principal chose  ൐ ͳ and the corresponding certainty equivalent of the delegation 
lottery is larger than the certainty equivalent of the control lottery. We can then calculate how 
often each principal assigns a positive or negative intrinsic value in the ten games. We find that 
the number of principals who have a positive intrinsic value more often (49) is significantly 
larger, at the 1% significance level, than the number of subjects who have a negative intrinsic 
value more often (14).31 We also conducted a sign test for each of the ten games separately, and 
find that principals significantly more often have a positive intrinsic value in 8 out of the 10 
games with at least 5% significance. We only fail to find a significant difference in games 5 and 
9. 
Third, we directly addressed the question whether those principals who choose ݁ ൌ ͳ indeed 
have a willingness to pay for delegation by conducting an additional control experiment with 34 
subjects. Part A of this experiment was equivalent to Part 1 of our main treatment. It served the 
purpose of identifying principals who choose ݁ ൌ ͳ and the games in which they do so. In Part B 
of the control experiment, we measured whether these principals are willing to pay for 
delegation. Part B was identical to Part A except for the following changes: (i) It was common 
31 For the remaining subjects, the number of games in which the measured intrinsic value was positive or negative is 
equal. 
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knowledge that the agents always had to choose an effort of ݁ ൌ ͳ and project alternative ࣛ in 
case of delegation, and that the principals might have to pay in order to delegate. (ii) Instead of 
announcing a minimum effort requirement as in Part A, the principals explicitly stated whether 
they wanted to keep control or delegate. (iii) If a principal kept control, she had to choose her 
implementation effort and the project alternative. But if a principal preferred delegation, we 
explicitly asked her to state her willingness to pay for delegation. The actual cost of delegation 
was drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 100 points. If the stated willingness to pay 
for delegation was above the realized cost, the principal paid that actual cost and delegated the 
decision right. Otherwise, the principal kept the decision right and her chosen project alternative 
and effort were implemented. This procedure ensured that a principal had an incentive to state 
her true willingness to pay for delegation. This willingness to pay for delegation informs us 
about the extent to which we may overestimate the intrinsic value of decision rights when corner 
solutions are chosen. 
The principals chose the corner solution  ൌ ͳ in 31 (18 percent) of 170 cases in Part A, but they 
were not willing to pay anything for delegating in Part B in 30 out of these 31 cases. The control 
experiment thus shows that those principals who choose a minimum effort requirement of 1 
almost never have a positive willingness to pay for delegation. We therefore conclude that our 
measure of the intrinsic value of decision rights is very unlikely to be distorted by those 
principals who choose  ൌ ͳ.
5.5.2 Bounded Rationality 
While it is not clear that a possible confusion on the part of the subjects would lead to a 
systematically higher valuation of the delegation over the control lotteries in Part 2, and not 
simply to more noise, we consider it important to highlight the measures that we took to ensure a 
clear understanding of the experimental conditions.  
First, subjects received comprehensive and detailed instructions in which the trade-off between 
keeping and delegating the decision right was explained. They also had to answer detailed 
control questions correctly before they were allowed to participate in the experiment. In 
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particular, principals were explicitly instructed to think about their point of indifference when 
choosing the minimum effort requirement: They were told to consider that the agent chooses 
some effort ݁, and to decide whether they would be willing to delegate the decision right to the 
agent if he chooses precisely this effort level. If they prefer keeping the decision right in this 
case, they were instructed to repeat the exercise assuming that the agent chooses an effort of 
݁ ൅ ͳ. It was then explained to them that they should set the minimum requirement exactly at 
agent’s lowest effort level at which they prefer delegation. Hence, principals were instructed in a 
way that should lead them to reveal their point of indifference.32
Second, principals were given the possibility of revising their choices during the experiment. 
After having chosen the minimum effort requirement and their own effort in case they retain the 
decision right, principals were shown the consequences of these choices side-by-side on their 
computer screen.33 In particular, they were shown the consequences of delegation assuming that 
the agent chooses precisely the minimum requirement (and project alternative ࣛ), i.e., the worst 
possible outcome after delegation, and the consequences of keeping the decision right (given 
their own effort and choice of the alternative). Note that these are precisely the outcomes that 
define the control and the delegation lotteries. At this stage, principals had the possibility of 
revising all their choices, i.e. they could change the minimum requirement or the own effort 
choice if they wished to do so. This design feature allowed them to fine-tune their choices in the 
delegation game in order to facilitate the revelation of the point of indifference. 
Further, the data indicate that the principals understood the trade-offs they faced when setting the 
minimum effort requirement well. In Table 1, we present predicted values for the minimum 
requirement assuming that principals are risk neutral and purely self-interested, and do not derive 
intrinsic value from the decision right. While we should not expect the observed values to co-
vary perfectly with these predictions, they are a useful benchmark for the variation in the actual 
minimum requirements across games. A regression of the chosen minimum effort requirements 
32 To avoid anchoring the principals to high effort values, the numerical example in the instructions started with an 
agent effort of 1. Consequently, if anchoring is a concern, it would work against our hypothesis, since it would 
create delegation lotteries of low value. 
33 An English translation of the instructions to the principal can be found on p. 2 of the Online Appendix, and the 
screenshots of the principals’ screen sequence in the delegation game can be found on p. 15 of the Online Appendix. 
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on the predicted values for ݁ in Table 1 confirms that the requirements vary as expected. The 
coefficient on the predictions is 0.74 (p<0.01), i.e. if the prediction increases by 1 point, the 
actually chosen minimum effort requirement increases by 0.74 points.34 Hence, the principals 
react strongly and in the predicted direction to changes in the delegation trade-off, which is 
further evidence that our subjects understood the experimental conditions well.35
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we provide evidence that individuals value decision rights intrinsically, 
demonstrate the robustness of this finding across different game parameterizations, and find that 
the magnitude of the intrinsic value of decision rights is correlated across individuals and 
parameterizations. These results provide evidence for the existence of non-transferable private 
benefits of control, the implications of which have been studied intensively in the theoretical 
corporate finance, governance, and organizational economics literatures. Evidence for the 
existence of such “psychic” private benefits makes a strong case for the relevance of the 
incomplete contracting approach in these literatures.  
What determines the size of the intrinsic value of decision rights? In this paper, we can only 
provide preliminary answers to the situational determinants of intrinsic value. We find that stake 
size matters. Doubling the stake size involved in a decision roughly doubles the intrinsic value 
component. With regard to the conflict of interest between the principal and the agent, a first 
intuition might suggest that the intrinsic value of decision rights is larger, the larger the conflict 
of interest. If their interests are perfectly aligned, for example, having the decision right might 
not be intrinsically valuable since the power relationship is less pronounced. Our data, however, 
34 Standard errors in the regression are clustered on the subject level. 
35 One specific form of bounded rationality would be to assume that principals form expectations about others’ 
behaviors in the lab or in real life by analogy with more familiar setups in which they know more about the effect of 
their actions on others (Samuelson, 2001; Jehiel, 2005). It could then be that principals expect their agents to shirk 
strongly after delegation, and this could induce principal's to set suboptimally high minimum effort requirements to 
avoid that delegation occurs. Note however, we must assume that the subjects fundamentally misunderstood the 
delegation mechanism in our experiment for this explanation to be valid because the principal’s beliefs about the 
agent’s effort are completely irrelevant for the optimal choice of the minimum effort requirement. Keep in mind that 
subjects were only allowed to participate in the experiment if they correctly answered all control questions. In 
addition, as described above, we devoted much effort in the instructions to explain the logic of setting an optimal 
minimum effort requirement.
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point in the opposite direction. Our interpretation is that decisions where the pursuit of self-
interest runs counter the interests of another party have an “unpleasant” component attached to 
them, which reduces the intrinsic value of decision rights. This effect might go so far that the 
intrinsic value of decision rights may even turn negative in situations with undesirable outcomes. 
This would be consistent with recent experimental findings on the attribution of responsibility 
for unfair decisions (Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012). We consider gaining further insights into 
the situational determinants of the intrinsic value of decision rights to be an interesting field for 
future research.  
The finding that individuals intrinsically value decision rights naturally leads to the question of 
the ultimate reason why people value decision rights beyond their instrumental benefits. One 
potential source stems directly from having or not having decision rights. Social psychologists 
argue that “human needs”, such as power (McClelland, 1975) or autonomy (Deci and Ryan, 
1985) constitute the source of the intrinsic value of power and autonomy. While the need for 
power implies that individuals value decision rights positively, the need for autonomy is 
potentially based on an aversion against being subordinate. Alternatively, decision rights could 
be intrinsically valuable because the utility received from specific outcomes depends on whether 
the outcome is a consequence of one’s own actions, the actions of someone else, or not the 
consequence of a choice at all. For example, Nozick (1975, pp. 48-51) argued that a person who 
shapes his own life according to his own plan gives meaning to that life. Hence, the same 
outcome may be more valuable if it is self-chosen rather than imposed by someone else.36
Further exploring these potential sources of the intrinsic value of decision rights provides exiting 
avenues for future research.  
36 Mill (1859, Chapter III) put forward a similar argument in his defense of liberty: “He who lets the world, or his 
own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. 
He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and 
judgment to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, 
firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision. And these qualities he requires and exercises exactly in 
proportion as the part of his conduct which he determines according to his own judgment and feelings is a large one. 
It is possible that he might be guided in some good path, and kept out of harm's way, without any of these things. 
But what will be his comparative worth as a human being? It really is of importance, not only what men do, but also 
what manner of men they are that do it.” 
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